Collective Redress in Antitrust


Europäisches Parlament (Foto: Wiki Commons)

Study requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Verfasser der Studie: Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione

Hier geht es zum Text der Studie.

Aus den Empfehlungen von Lear:

"6. Recommendations
Building on the results of the previous chapters, we provide the following
recommendations:

6.1.1. Legal instrument: horiontal or antitrust-specific
In our view, an efficient collective redress system in antitrust should be introduced through
a sector-specific measure. An antitrust-specific measure would be focused on enhancing
private antitrust enforcement by removing inequality between the Member States in the
level of judicial protection of individual rights directly stemming from Articles 101 and 102
TFEU. [...]

6.1.2. Legal basis: Article 103 TFEU
Among the legal bases analysed, Article 103 TFEU seems to be the most appropriate
Treaty provision for an EU legislative initiative in the field of collective redress in antitrust. [...]

6.1.3. Legislative Act: directive or regulation
In our view, the most effective legislative act for a sector-specific initiative in EU
competition law would be a regulation. Since existing national collective redress systems
have general scope and are not limited to competition law enforcement, the introduction of
an ad hoc special mechanism by means of regulation would create a uniform, efficient EU
procedural instrument to be added to existing national ones.

6.2. Incentives and safeguards
Opt-in vs. opt-out: Besides being more in line with European legal tradition, the opt-in
model has the important advantage of limiting the risk of unmeritorious claims, and it
appears overall preferable to the opt-out model. However, it might be useful to also
consider hybrid solutions that, while retaining opt-in as the general rule, permit adopting
an opt-out model in some clear and limited circumstances, such as for instance when
injured consumers have suffered a damage of small value and are therefore unlikely to opt
in a collective action. Courts may be granted discretion as to whether the opt-out model is
necessary to guarantee that a significant proportion of injured parties are compensated for
the damages suffered. [...]"


Das Thema der öffentlichen Antrittsvorlesung von Prof. Bien am 6.7.2012 lautet: "Perspektiven für eine europäische Gruppenklage bei Kartellverstößen?"

21.06.2012, 14:46 Uhr